Abstract: This Note advocates for the reform of the federal initial
Introduction
Discovery, a significant component of the civil adjudicatory process, can impose devastating, even prohibitive, costs on both parties and nonparties to litigation.1 In 2009, in In re Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a contempt citation against the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight ("OFHEO") for failing to comply with a discovery deadline.2 The OFHEO was a nonparty to multidistrict litigation against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), a government-sponsored mortgage provider that the OFHEO regulated.3 Several former Fannie Mae executives subpoenaed the OFHEO to obtain records collected pursuant to its oversight functions and a 2003 investigation of Fannie Mae's financial and accounting practices.4 2 In re Fannie Mae, 552 F.3d at 824. This case illustrates the potentially exorbitant costs of discovery and the associated need for discovery reform. See id. at 817. This Note explores reform of the federal initial disclosure rule as a means to achieve efficiencies and cost savings in the federal discovery scheme. See infra notes 99-309 and accompanying text.
3 In re Fannie Mae, 552 F.3d at 816. 4 Id.
Initial disclosures14 are information exchanged on a self-executing basis15 at the outset of litigation. 16 The Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System ("Joint Project") emphasized reform of the federal initial disclosure rule in its Final Report, in fact calling its initial disclosure reform recommendations "radical" and its most "significant."17 The Massachusetts Superior Court's Business Litigation Session ("BLS") also recently put the Joint Project's federal initial disclosure reform recommendations into practice, administering a state-level pilot program from January 2010 to December 2010. 18 This Note advocates for reform of the federal initial disclosure requirement.19 It asserts that plausible pleadings, mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, provide sufficient foundation to support increased use of initial disclosures. 20 The Note specifically argues that-per the Final Report's recommendation and the Massachusetts reform initial disclosure model-the federal initial disclosure rule should be amended to include an actual production requirement. 21 The Final Report and the Massachusetts pilot's emphasis on initial disclosures as a principal discovery tool, however, is too ambitious to warrant national replication. 22 Part I chronicles the ever-broadening development of discovery in the American civil justice system and the resultant concern that discovery has become so broad as to become overly burdensome and costly.23 Part I then presents survey data capturing the experiences of litigating attorneys in federal court regarding the extent of the discovery problem. 24 Part II first focuses on initial disclosures as a discovery tool, describing the history and development of the current federal initial disclosure scheme.25 Part II next describes the reform initial disclosure rule proposed in the Joint Project's Final Report, and put into practice in the Massachusetts Superior Court. 26 Part III reconsiders the role of initial disclosures in the American civil justice system in light of the Final Report's recommendations and the Massachusetts's initial disclosure reform model.27 It presents arguments for and against initial disclosures as effective discovery tools and highlights a principal criticism, manifest in practice, that notice pleadings fail to provide a sufficient foundation for any significant use of initial disclosures.28 Part III then relates the Supreme Court's decision in Twombly, which imposed a plausible pleading requirement on litigants in federal court. 29 Part IV argues for increased use of initial disclosure in the federal discovery scheme.30 It asserts that the central argument against initial disclosures has been undermined by the plausible pleading requirement and that plausible pleadings are sufficiently specific to support increased use of initial disclosures.31 In particular, Part IV argues for actual production of documents substantiating facts plausibly alleged as initial disclosures, but not for the use of initial disclosures as a principal document discovery tool.32 In so doing, this Note supports the national adoption of one of two principles features of the reform initial disclosure rule advanced in the Final Report and piloted in Massachusetts.33 I. The Federal Discovery Scheme: History, Concerns, and Costs This Part focuses on the history of civil litigation discovery in the United States and efforts to measure its costs.34 Section A tracks the development of discovery as it broadened in scope from before the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through the early 1970s.35 Section B highlights several recent studies on the current impact of discovery in the American civil justice system.36 These studies sought to capture whether and to what extent discovery is prohibitively expensive and burdensome.37 Accordingly, the studies are significant for their role in informing the discovery reform debate.38
A. Civil Discovery in America: Its History and Breaking Point
In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, discovery in the federal judicial system in the United States was minimal.39 The limi- Early state-level civil procedure codes included discovery rules, albeit in a more limited form than those employed in the federal system today. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 Duke L.J. 547, 554 n.27 (2010); Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696 (discussing the limited discovery under the Field Code). New York's Field Code system-the first code of civil procedure in the United States-serves as an example. Beisner, supra, at 554; Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 693, 696. Under the Field Code, advanced by David Dudley Field and implemented in New York in 1848, document requests were rare and were only available with court permission. Beisner, supra, at 554, 555 n.27; Subrin, supra, at 693. Depositions were similarly infrequent and could only be taken from the opposition in open court. Beisner, supra, at 555; Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696. Interrogatories were forbidden. Beisner, supra, at 555; Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696 (quoting Stephen N. Subrin Many state civil procedure codes were patterned on New York's Field Code. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed, supra, at 696. The Field Code also influenced the adoption of the first national code of civil procedure, the 1912 Equity Rules, which have subsequently been superseded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"). See 4 Charles Alan tations on a party's ability to discover the factual position of an opponent were due to practical considerations, as well as values and religious beliefs.40 Travel was historically difficult, making obtaining discoverable information impractical.41 Juries were composed of community members already familiar with the facts of the case; therefore, additional fact-finding was considered unnecessary.42 The American value of selfsufficiency also counseled against discovery, as it was difficult to reconcile the autonomy impulse with the obligation to aid an opponent through information disclosure.43 Minimal discovery may further be attributed to the view that litigation was not a rational quest for objective fact, but an effort to determine God's truth or serve the perceived interests of justice.44
In the 1911 decision Carpenter v. Winn, the Supreme Court held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not empower the court to compel pre-trial discovery of books and other writings.45 Demonstrating the prevailing view of discovery at the time, the Court reasoned that such pre-trial document discovery amounted to prying into the affairs of the adversary; therefore, it was impermissible.46
Although pre-trial discovery remained relatively rare into the 1930s, suspicion of discovery was waning.47 By 1932, some states permitted the use of interrogatories and the taking of witness's depositions.48 In 1938, the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"), which includes the modern discovery rules.49 The purpose behind the adoption of the Rules was to secure "just, speedy [ and inexpensive" dispute resolution, for example by encouraging information exchange in discovery. 50 Although the Rules broadened the scope of permissible discovery, federal courts were still loath to make full use of the discovery rules.51 It was not until the 1946 amendments to the Rules that liberal discovery was truly embraced.52 The Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Hickman v. Taylor-that an attorney's work-product was privileged and immune from discovery-demonstrated the Court's changed view.53 Notwithstanding its decision to preclude discovery of privileged material in the instant case, the Court proclaimed that the discovery rules were to be "accorded a broad and liberal treatment."54
With the Supreme Court's blessing and the discovery tools in place, discovery proceeded along an ever-broadening trajectory.55 In 1970, the scope of discovery hit an apex when drafters amended the Rules to remove vestiges of limits on discovery from previous iterations of the Rules.56 The 1970 amendments also brought concerns that discovery had become over broad to the fore.57 The sentiment was that 50 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. To advance "just, speedy, and inexpensive" dispute resolution remains the central tenant of the Rules today. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (reporting that discovery was intended to provide each side with full information to encourage settlement or, at the very least, prevent "trial by ambush"); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (setting the goal of discovery at obtaining the fullest possible knowledge of the central facts and disputed issues before trial).
51 Beisner, supra note 39, at 558-59. For example, some courts limited discovery to admissible evidence. Id. at 558. Others disallowed discovery of information related to the adversary's case and permitted discovery only to support a requesting party's own case. Id.
558-59.
52 See id. at 559. A feature of the 1946 Amendments was to make clear that discovery was applicable even to inadmissible evidence, so long as information discovered was likely to lead to information that would be admissible. Id.
53 See 329 U.S. at 509-10. 54 Id. at 507 (rejecting the argument that discovery should be precluded because it amounts to a "fishing expedition").
55 Beisner, supra note 39, at 560-61; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (reporting that discovery worked well for thirty-five years before problems started to arise); see also Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 747, 748 (1998) (finding the "highwater mark" of discovery in 1970).
56 See Beisner, supra note 39, at 560-61; Marcus, supra note 55, at 748-49. The 1970 amendments allowed parties to pursue discovery as frequently as desired and abandoned the requirement that parties show "good cause" to justify a document production request. Beisner, supra note 39, at 561.
57 Beisner, supra note 39, at 561 (writing of the backlash against broad discovery in 1970); Bell, supra note 49, at 9 (reporting that discovery problems were recognized by the mid-1970s); Marcus, supra note 55, at 752 (finding that opposition to the liberal thrust of discovery grew by 1970); Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (asserting that it was approximately in the 1970s when the burdens of discovery began skyrocketting). Beisner also attributes the increased total amount of discovery to the increased volume of litigation asso-discovery was dominating litigation.58 Litigants had come to use discovery tools like depositions, interrogatories, and requests for document production as weapons to overburden and wear down the opponent.59 Even if not used to inflict intentional abuse, discovery was thought to occasion excess.60 Anxious to leave no stone unturned, parties were using the discovery tools to over-discover, requesting and producing much more than necessary to inform the key issues in dispute.61 As a consequence, cases were viewed as turning on a party's ability to endure discovery and not the merits of the underlying claim.62
Breadth in and of itself was less of a concern than the perceived costs-both in time and money-of overbroad discovery.63 Such concerns resulted in decades of debate over how to fashion the rules to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of liberal discovery.64 The advent of electronic discovery ensured the continuing vitality of the debate over how to curb discovery abuse and safeguard against the unwarranted expense and delay often associated with discovery.65 ciated with civil rights legislation, the enforcement of criminal penalties, and the increase in suits between private parties. Beisner, supra note 39, at 560. The project was initiated in response to the concern that the increasing length and expense of discovery was adversely affecting the American civil justice system.70
The Joint Project began by conducting a survey of the fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers.71 Regarding the costs of discovted). The costs of producing electronically stored information also exceeds that of paper documents because, unlike paper records, electronic data must be processed into a special database to be reviewed for relvance. Of the 3812 fellows who received the survey, 1494, or 42%, responded. Id. at 2. Respondents averaged thirty-eight years of experience practicing law. Id. Of the participants, 31% exclusively represented defendants, 24% represented exclusively represented plaintiffs, and 44% represented both on occasion, though they primarily represented defendants. Id. The survey methodology has been criticized as according too great a weight to ery, "85% of respondents thought that litigation in general, and discovery in particular, are too expensive."72 Over 75% of respondents agreed that discovery costs increased disproportionally due to electronic discovery.73 In response to questions about delays associated with discovery, 56% reported that the time required to complete discovery was the principal cause of delay in litigation.74 Further, there was overwhelming agreement that discovery delay and cost are directly related; according to 92% of respondents, "the longer a case goes on, the more it costs."75 From these survey results, the Joint Project's Final Report concluded that the discovery process was prohibitively costly and has taken on a life disproportionate to the scope of the underlying litigation.76 Therefore, the authors of the Final Report concluded that the current rules governing discovery are in serious need of reform.77
Empirical studies have also produced data on the extent of costs and delays associated with discovery.78 Two studies in particular were considered at a conference held by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in May 2010 on issues of cost and delay in the federal civil litigation system. fourth quarter of 2008.81 The survey showed that, in cases which employed one or more discovery tools, the median litigation cost including attorney's fees was $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.82 It also revealed that litigation costs are generally proportionate to the stakes of the underlying claim.83 Therefore, the authors concluded that the medians do not support the contention that federal litigation is too costly.84 The costs of discovery in high-stakes litigation, however, were significant.85 Plaintiffs and defendants in the 95th percentile of discovery costs spent $280,000 and $300,000 respectively.86
The RAND Institute for Civil Justice87 and the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth88 conducted a second study which focused on the discovery costs of large companies in litigation 81 Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 5. A sample population for this study was created using the Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Data Base which included information on all civil cases closed in the final quarter of 2008, with the exception of cases in which discovery problems were unlikely, such as social security claims, student loan collection actions, and bankruptcy appeals. Id. at 77. Eighty percent, or a total of 5685 attorneys for both the plaintiff and defendant in each case, were contacted to take the survey; 2690, or approximately 47%, responded. Id. at 77-78. This report has been called particularly authoritative because it elicited information about specific cases, not merely general impressions. Koeltl, supra note 79, at 539. 84 Lee & Willging, supra note 82, at 770; see also Willging, supra note 83, at 527 (finding that, contrary to popular belief that the costs of discovery are excessive and disproportionate to the stakes of the underlying case, empirical research suggests that discovery costs are modest and proportional).
85 Koeltl, supra note 79, at 539 (citing Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 35-36). Others have also suggested that "problematic discovery" is confined to "complex-high-stakes litigation." See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 683, 683, 685 (1998). Scholars thus found that discovery does not pose cost problems in the majority of litigation. Id. at 683.
86 Lee & Willging, supra note 66, at 36. 87 The RAND Institute for Civil Justice is a non-profit division of the RAND Corporation and conducts research to further the goals of efficiency and equity in the civil justice system. About the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corp., http://www.rand.org/icj/ about.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
88 The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth is a non-profit research and education center at Northwestern University School of Law and focuses on the impact of law and regulation on economic growth. Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, Northwestern Law, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter (last visited Apr. 6, 2011).
with litigation costs exceeding $250,000.89 Although only some respondents provided data on a per-case basis, companies that did exhibited average discovery costs ranged from $621,880 to $2,993,567 between 2006 and 2008.90 Companies reporting at the high end of discovery costs reported average per-case discovery costs of between $2,354,868 and $9,759,900.91 Authors of the report believed the cost estimates were conservative.92 The authors concluded that companies are annually spending billions on litigation and that discovery costs assume a large portion of the total litigation costs.93 Thus, according to the report, "[r]eform is clearly needed."94
The story of discovery in the United States is one of expanding breadth.95 Such growth led to concerns that over-broad discovery compromises the central purpose of the Rules and impose significant burdens and costs on litigants in federal court.96 Studies, including recent efforts by the Joint Project, the Federal Judicial Center, the RAND Institute, and the Searle Center, attempted to capture or quantify the extent to which discovery impedes federal civil litigation.97 Although there is variance among researchers as to the extent of the discovery problem, there is agreement that discovery can lead to significant expense and delay.98
II. The Federal Initial Disclosure Scheme and Reform Models
Section A of this Part begins by chronicling the development of the federal initial disclosure rule from its initial recommendation in 1991 to its present form.99 The Section then provides a detailed de-89 Major Companies, supra note 66, at 2. The study was based on a survey which was sent to all of the Fortune 200 companies in December 2009. Id. Nearly 20% of target companies, representing fourteen of the nineteen industry sectors, responded. Id. The study has been criticized as having a relatively small sample size and low response rate. Lee & Willging, supra note 82, at 770 (reporting that the response rate in Major Companies, supra note 65 was only 10%). Lee and Willging also note that, although reported costs may appear high in absolute terms, high costs do not answer the relative question of whether they are too high, or not worth the price. When the inclusion of a federal initial disclosure rule was first recommended in 1991, the proposed rule was worded broadly.105 The draft language called for the initial disclosure of "information that bears significantly on any claim or defense."106 Opposition to the broad language of the proposed rule by members of the drafting committee compelled redrafting of the proposed rule in narrower terms. 107 When Rule 26(a)(1), which mandated initial disclosure, was first adopted in 1993, it limited requisite initial disclosures to potential evidence "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."108 The "par-ticularity" concept narrowed the initial disclosure obligation envisioned in the draft rule in an effort not to impose on parties' obligations to disclose evidence of uncertain relevance in response to broad or ambiguous pleadings.109
The 1993 version of Rule 26(a)(1) also included an "opt-out" provision, which permitted districts to decline to impose initial disclosure obligations entirely, or to choose whether to comply with federal or instead with local initial disclosure rules.110 This provision was included to mollify the critics of a national initial disclosure rule, but also to allow room for experimentation with different initial disclosure schemes.111
The lack of national uniformity which resulted from the opt-out provision led, in part, to an amendment of Rule 26(a)(1) in 2000.112 The 2000 amendment restored procedural uniformity by requiring that all judicial districts comply with the federal initial disclosure requirements.113 The language of Rule 26(a)(1) was also amended in 2000.114 The "particularity" requirement was replaced with even narrower terminology.115 That revision to Rule 26(a)(1), the pertinent language of which survives today, mandates only that a party initially disclose information it "may use to support its claims or defenses."116 Replacing the tary evidence, damages, and insurance as the basic information litigants should provide their adversaries without awaiting formal discovery requests). plead "with particularity" language with the "may use" provision was intended to signal that a party need not disclose information that was harmful to its case; parties would not use incriminating information, so initial disclosures would not oblige a party to turn over information that would aid its opponent.117 The result of the 2000 amendment to Rule 26 was, thus, a diminished initial disclosure obligation.118 As a consequence, the bulk of document discovery was pushed to later in the discovery process.119 Thus, the initial disclosure rule that stands today functions as a narrow stepping stone into expansive discovery.120 The current Rule 26, the basic roadmap to discovery, contains the federal initial disclosure requirement.121 Rule 26(a)(1)(A) concerns initial disclosures and provides for four categories of information which a party is required to produce as initial disclosures.122 The first is "the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information . . . that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.123 The second category is either "a copy-or a description by category and location-of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession . . . may use to support its claims or defenses."124 The third category is a "computation of each category of damages."125 The fourth and final category is "any insurance agreement" implicated in the litigation.126
The second category of requisite initial disclosures governing document discovery has two defining characteristics.127 The first is that actual production is not required in order to satisfy the initial document disclosure obligation.128 Under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), parties satisfy the initial disclosure obligation by providing their adversary with a statement describing discoverable documents by category and location; actual production of discoverable documents as initial disclosures is not mandated.129 Adversaries, therefore, are generally expected to actually obtain documents by serving a production request under Rule 34 on their adversary or by requesting production of documents through informal means.130 The onus is thus on the party seeking information to Circuit held that a party was precluded from admitting evidence of "lost profits" for failure to specifically include damages from lost profits as initial disclosures. The court concluded that the rule requiring the "computation of damages" imposed on a party a higher burden than the mere initial disclosure of general financial damages calculations. Id. at 293 (requiring the disclosing party to provide a specific formula illustrating its theory of damages from lost profits).
126 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). Per Rule 26(e), a party who has made initial disclosures has a continuing duty to timely supplement those disclosures if they are found to be incomplete or incorrect, or if ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). Failure to comply with the initial disclosure requirements under Rule 26 results in the exclusion of undisclosed information from evidence unless the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Sanctions for failure to comply with initial disclosure requirements may also be imposed, including the payment of reasonable expenses and attorneys fees, prohibiting the party that failed to disclose from supporting or opposing implicated claims or defenses, striking the pleadings in whole or in part, or dismissing an action in whole or in part. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A), (1)(C) (incorporating by reference Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(vi)). take affirmative steps to procure actual production of discoverable documents.131
The second noteworthy feature is that document discovery is typically not completed at the initial disclosure stage.132 To the contrary, initial disclosures generally serve as an entrée into an expansive discovery process.133 Accordingly, the default is that although initial disclosures begin discovery, the bulk of information exchange occurs on a rolling basis throughout the remainder of the discovery process.134
That initial disclosures merely commence-as opposed to serve as a principal tool of-document discovery is more a function of culture than anything attributable to the plain language of the initial disclosure rule. (reporting that the current practice in federal court is to pursue virtually limitless discovery until a court says to stop); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (2000) (narrowing the scope of the federal initial disclosure obligation).
135 Final Report, supra note 17, at 9-11 (characterizing the federal scheme as one of "unlimited discovery" following initial disclosures); id. 137 Id. at 331, 333-34. 138 Id. at 333. The Merck-Medco court noted that no circuit court had rendered a decision concerning the application of Rule 26(a), but that the at least one district court the federal initial disclosure requirement is to provide an efficient start to discovery by fostering the early exchange of basic information.139 After the initial disclosure stage, parties have the remainder of the discovery period to obtain more specific information.140 Thus, in the view of the Merck-Medco court, the defendants could gather more focused and specific information during discovery; complete document discovery was not expected at the initial disclosure phase.141
B. The Impetus for and Model of Reform: Theoretical Foundations and Implementation in Practice
An initial disclosure scheme which requires actual production and uses initial disclosure as a primary document discovery tool would drastically transform the approach to initial disclosures in common practice in federal court.142 The Joint Project called for that very transformation.143
In response to Joint Project questions on the function and effectiveness of the federal initial disclosure requirement, survey respondents expressed their views on initial disclosures mandated under Rule 26(a)(1).144 Nearly two-thirds of survey respondents said that the current requirements under the Federal Rules "did not reduce discovery or save the client money."145 grounded its interpretation of the rule in legislative intent extrapolated from the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26. Id. The Advisory Committee Notes, however, simply state that the disclosure requirements should be applied with "common sense." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1993); Fitz Inc., 174 F.R.D. at 589 (explaining that a "common sense" application of the initial disclosure rule bears the purpose of the rule-the exchange of basic information-in mind).
139 Merck-Medco, 223 F.R.D. at 333. 140 Id. (viewing initial disclosures as a "mere starting" point of the discovery process). 141 Id. at 334. 142 Final Report, supra note 17, at 7-11 (distinguishing its recommendations from the federal initial disclosure requirements because the reform initial disclosure scheme would: (1) require actual production and, (2) conceive of initial disclosure as a principal document discovery tool). In another study of discovery reform efforts, conducted after the 1993 adoption of the federal initial disclosure rule, researchers also elicited survey respondents' views on initial disclosure requirements. See Willging, supra note 83, at 542. Forty-one percent of survey respondents favored a uniform national initial disclosure rule, 27% preferred to not have an initial disclosure obligation at all, and 30% would have preferred no change to the initial disclosure scheme at the time, which permitted a choice to follow either federal or location initial disclosure rules. Id. at 543; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) Given the sentiment of the majority of survey respondents that initial disclosures failed to realize their purpose of reducing later discovery,146 the Final Report made two principal recommendations for restructuring the current initial disclosure requirement under the Federal Rules. 147 First, the Final Report proposed broadening Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) beyond the permitted "disclosure" of discoverable documents by providing a description of documents by category and location.148 The suggested revision would instead mandate the actual production of discoverable documents.149 The reason was that early and actual production of documents, without a formal request and the related delay, would foster more effective document exchange, narrow the issues in dispute, and promote settlement.150
The Final Report touted its second reform of the federal initial disclosure scheme as a "radical" and its most "significant" proposal.151 The Final Report proposed only limited discovery after the initial disclosure phase.152 Any further document discovery beyond initial and advisory committee's note (1993) (explaining that the "opt-out" provision allowed districts either to forgo initial disclosure obligations or enforce local initial disclosure rules). Given the choice of thirteen changes that might reduce litigation costs, the imposition of a national initial disclosure rule came in second with 44% of votes (following only increased judicial case management with 54% of votes). Id. at 542.
146 Interim Report, supra note 70, at 4. 147 Final Report, supra note 17, at 7-11. The Final Report recommended that, shortly after the commencement of litigation, each party should produce "all reasonably available, nonprivileged, non-work product documents and things that may be used to support that party's claims, counterclaims [,] or defenses." Id. at 7.
148 Id. at 7-8. 149 Id. (maintaining, in addition, a supplemental disclosure requirement as mandated under the Federal Rules); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A)-(B) (requiring parties that have made initial disclosures or responded to interrogatories, requests for production, or requests for admission, to supplement or correct its disclosure if a previous disclosure was incomplete or incorrect in material part and additional or corrective information had not otherwise been made available during discovery, or a court ordered supplemental disclosure). Author Eric Spade also proposed an initial disclosure scheme which emphasized actual production. Spade, supra note 14, at 187-88. He recommended actual production of documents in "discovery-simple" cases (those with limited amounts of discoverable information) and description of documents by category and location in "discovery-intensive" cases (those of heightened complexity). Id.
150 Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. By way of enforcement, the Final Report recommends that a single judge oversee a case from beginning to end in order to be in the best position to make any requisite rulings, including on discovery matters. ) (imagining an initial disclosure scheme which obviates the need for subsequent, substantial discovery). Senior U.S. District Judge William Schwarzer proposed a similar reform that placed heightened emphasis on initial disclo-supplemental disclosure would require either an agreement between parties or a court order.153 A court order permitting further document discovery would only be granted upon a showing of good cause and that the costs of discovery were proportionate to the magnitude of the underlying claim.154
C. Discovery Pilot Project
In addition to recommending an alternative-use model for initial disclosures in theory, the Final Report also informed the development of a discovery reform effort put into practice by the Massachusetts Superior Court.155 Administered by the Business Litigation Session ("BLS"), the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot Project ("Discovery Pilot") ran from sures as a principal document discovery tool. Id. Judge Schwarzer envisioned a system in which each party filing an action would serve not only a summons and a complaint on the adverse party, but also a copy of all reasonably available documents which support any claim or defense. Id. The adverse party would similarly include all documents supporting its defense and potential counter-claims with a responsive pleading. Id. Most significantly, any further document discovery beyond self-executing initial disclosures would require permission from the court. Id.
153 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. 154 Id. The guiding principal of the Final Report was one of limited discovery, tied proportionally to the magnitude of the claims being litigated. Id. at 7. The "proportionality principal" was grounded in the notion that the cost of discovery should not far exceed the amount in controversy. Id.
Beyond making recommendations concerning reform of the federal initial disclosure requirement, the Final Report included proposed amendments to many current discovery rules. Final Report, supra note 17, at 4-24; see supra notes 142-154 and accompanying text. It recommended limiting requests for admission and interrogatories. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (interrogatories); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (requests for admission); Final Report, supra note 17, at 17. The Final Report suggested that prospective trial witnesses be disclosed early in the pretrial phase. Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. It also recommended limiting the scope of discovery to facts that foster the "'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules); Final Report, supra note 17, at 11-12. The Final Report further recommended imposing limits on electronic discovery. Final Report, supra note 17, at 14. All reforms of the current discovery rules were based on the proportionality principal, meaning that the scope of discovery should not exceed the magnitude of the underlying claim. Id. at 7.
The Final Report also made recommendations for reform of the civil justice system beyond restructuring the discovery tools. Id. at 4-7, 17-24. The Final Report advocated for fact-based, as opposed to notice, pleadings. Id. at 5. It recommended increased judicial management, characterized by increased oversight by a single judicial officer who remains with a suit from beginning to end. Id. at 18. It proposed a limit of only one expert witness per party, absent extenuating circumstances. Id. at 17. The Final Report further encouraged the increased use of pre-trial dispositive motions to identify and/or resolve issues. Id. at 18.
155 SJC Press Release, supra note 18, at 1.
January to December 2010.156 Participation in the Discovery Pilot was available on a voluntary basis for any BLS matter that had not had a case management conference or had not commenced prior to the Discovery Pilot start date.157 The purpose of the Discovery Pilot was to reduce the burden and cost of civil pretrial discovery.158
In accordance with the Final Report's recommendations, the guiding principal of the Discovery Pilot was limited discovery tied proportionally to the magnitude of the litigation.159 The proportionality assessment took into account "such factors as the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, and the complexity and importance of the issues at stake." 160 To realize this objective, BLS judges and litigants who agreed to participate in the Discovery Pilot worked together, typically in the setting of a case management conference, to define the scope of requisite discovery.161 Pilot participants identified potentially dispositive issues at the outset so discovery could center on the principal matters in dispute.162 Litigant-participants also limited the length of the discovery period as well as the number of people from whom discovery would be sought. 463-464 (2011) . Arizona, for example, has a broader initial disclosure requirement than that mandated under the Federal Rules. Id. The Arizona initial disclosure rule requires disclosure, not only of the facts of the case, but also information on the legal theory on which the claim is based. Id.
165 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2-3; Final Report, supra note 17, at 7-11. 166 Dew, supra note 83, at 787 (quoting BLS Judge Margaret Hinkle, calling the Discovery Pilot a "'very radical departure'" from Massachusetts practice).
Discovery Pilot, initial disclosures required actual production of discoverable documents167 whereas, in federal court, litigants chose either to actually produce or to describe documents by category and location. 168 The Discovery Pilot model further front-loaded discovery by mandating that the bulk of documents be exchanged as initial disclosures.169 By using initial disclosures as a principal document exchange tool, the Discovery Pilot emphasized early and near-total automatic disclosure of discoverable information.170 This differed from the federal discovery scheme which merely opens with initial disclosures but then allows for subsequent discovery.171
That the Discovery Pilot was administered by the BLS was also noteworthy.172 The BLS is responsible for adjudicating commercial disputes.173 This is significant because there is data to suggest that initial disclosures may be less effective in high stakes and complex cases, such 167 Discovery Pilot participants produced all documents that would be used to support that party's claims, counter claims, or defenses at the beginning of the discovery phase without awaiting a document request from the opposing party. BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2-3 (incorporating the initial disclosure mechanism under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A), which similarly mandates initial disclosure without awaiting a discovery request). Only privileged materials, work product, or documents not reasonably available were exempt from the actual production requirement. Id. at 2. Moreover, initial disclosures were complemented by an ongoing, self-executing duty to supplement information provided at the outset of litigation as new and relevant information became available. Id.
168 Compare BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2 (requiring actual production of documents as initial disclosures), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (allowing a party to describe discoverable documents by category and location).
169 BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 3 (citing Final Report, supra note 17, at 9) (recommending that only limited discovery be permitted after the initial disclosure).
170 See id. at 3. As the authors of the Final Report similarly recommended, if a party wanted to expand the scope of discoverable information, it would have to obtain an agreement from the opposing party. Id.; see also Final Report, supra note 17, at 9. Alternatively, the party desiring additional discovery could seek a court order. BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 3. A court order, however, would only be granted upon a showing of good cause and proportionality. Id.
Commentators have observed that the Discovery Pilot approach has potential benefits as well as drawbacks. Robert M. Elmer, Commentary: BLS Discovery Pilot Has Potential Benefits, Drawbacks, allBusiness (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedurepretrial-discovery/14155716-1.html. The benefits included increased focus on dispositive issues from the outset of litigation, less business interruption, and ensuring proportionality of discovery to the stakes of the claim. Id. Drawbacks, however, were that courts have no clear guidance as to how to apply the proportionality test and that parties give up control over their own discovery. as complex commercial matters.174 Therefore, the BLS of the Massachusetts Superior Court not only put into practice an initial document disclosure scheme that stands in marked contrast to the federal rule,175 but it also did so in a setting in which effective use of initial disclosures may be least expected.176 III. The Potential Usefulness of Initial Disclosures: Benefits, Drawbacks, and the Link to Specificity in Pleadings
In light of the Final Report's recommendations and Massachusetts's discovery reform model, this Part reconsiders the role of initial disclosures in the American civil justice system.177 Section A summarizes the principal arguments for the use of initial disclosures, including that they: (1) ensure early and meaningful information exchange in an adversarial system, (2) increase litigation efficiency, and (3) serve the information-sharing purpose of discovery. 178 It further presents arguments against initial disclosures including that they: (1) neither foster time nor cost savings, (2) do not fit comfortably in an adversarial system, and (3) pose ethical challenges.179 Section A also highlights a concern that pervades the criticism of initial disclosure use: that notice pleadings fail to provide sufficient foundation to support initial disclosure of discoverable documents.180
Section B then demonstrates that initial disclosures typically have, in fact, been used to a greater extent in jurisdictions with fact-based pleadings, as in many civil law countries. 
A. Supporters and Detractors: Opposing Views on Initial Disclosure
Proponents of initial disclosure as a valuable discovery tool point to several principal ways in which initial disclosure requirements enhance discovery.184 One theory is that initial disclosure rules foster exchange of discoverable information early in the pre-trial stages of litigation.185 Advocates argue that absent an initial disclosure requirement, the adversarial system disincentivizes disclosing information to the opposing party.186 The argument is that litigators are so intent on beating 183 See infra notes 233-238 and accompanying text. The descriptor "plausibility" qualifies notice pleadings. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. It indicates that complaints principally intended to notify an adversary of a pending claim must include enough facts to state a plausible claim. Id. The plausibility requirement does not signal a wholesale change from notice to fact-based pleadings. Id. (maintaining that heightened fact pleading is not required). But see id. 588 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plausibility requirement does heighten the pleading standard). 1314, 1349 (1978) . This article influenced the amendment of the federal discovery rules to include an initial disclosure requirement. Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a) advisory committee's note (1993).
186 Brazil, supra note 185, at 1349 (arguing that the adversarial structure impairs discovery's disclosure objective); see also Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 714 (observing the inconsistency of aiding an opponent in an adversarial system). That the adversarial systemabsent a mandatory initial disclosure rule-frustrates disclosure objectives is compounded by an incentive structure which punishes information disclosure. Brazil, supra note 185, at 1312. A lawyer who discloses information harmful to a client (absent an initial disclosure obligation) risks the economic consequences of losing the case. Id. The lawyer also risks gaining the reputation of being a less-than-zealous advocate. Id. In a worst case scenario, their adversary that they cannot be trusted to disclose discoverable information on their own accord.187 It is instead more likely to find lawyers playing hide-the-ball than willing to disclose information in the name of cooperation or truth-seeking. 188 And, because increasing numbers of civil actions settle before trial, discovery often becomes the only battlefield on which to win a fight.189 Therefore, initial disclosure rules serve as tools to compel information sharing, particularly in the early stages of litigation.190
The meaningful exchange of initial disclosures also advances litigation efficiency objectives.191 Informed by initial disclosures, parties have the tools necessary to evaluate the relative strengths of their positions closer to the outset of litigation.192 Thus, the initial disclosure of relevant information encourages settlement. 193 Initial disclosure rules also foster administrative efficiency.194 A key characteristic that distinguishes initial from other types of requisite disclosures is that they are self-executing, meaning that parties disclose information to their adversaries without awaiting a discovery request.195 As a result, the use of initial disclosures as a discovery tool eliminates the extra step of a Rule 34 document request, or any other informal request for information.196 This saves both the cost of additional pathe lawyer who voluntarily discloses relevant information that damages a client's case runs the risk of being sued for legal malpractice. Id. ("[F]ull disclosure becomes a luxury few lawyers can afford to pursue."). Therefore, initial disclosure rules are necessary to safeguard lawyers from the potential ramifications of disclosing information in the absence of an obligation to do so. ( recounting an argument that it is "naïve" to think that lawyers will comply with automatic disclosure requirements).
191 See Final Report, supra note 17, at 8. An empirical study showed that initial disclosures achieved their desired outcomes. See Willging, supra note 83, at 534-35. Such outcomes included decreased litigation expense, shortened discovery, and increased prospects for settlement and fair outcomes. Id.
192 Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. perwork as well as the delay associated with awaiting a response to a discovery request. 197 Proponents also assert that initial disclosure requirements serve the information-sharing purpose of the federal discovery rules.198 Critics caution that the discovery system has become dominated by the process at the expense of the disclosure objective.199 The argument, thus, is that broad initial disclosure requirements are important because they rightly serve the essential purpose of discovery: information disclosure. 200 In contrast, critics argue that initial disclosures will not foster efficient discovery. 201 Justice Scalia, dissenting from the recommended adoption of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules, argued that imposing initial disclosure obligations would have counter-productive consequences.202 Disputes could erupt over whether the initial disclosure duty was satisfied, leading to increased motions practice as parties allege failed compliance and pursue sanctions.203 Judges might also have to assume greater burdens, tasked with regulating and enforcing initial disclosure obligations. 204 Initial disclosure requirements could also foster over discovery.205 In an effort to avoid challenges or sanctions for failure to disclose, par-ties might expend resources producing extraneous information that turns out to be irrelevant to the litigation.206 Parties may also hide behind an initial disclosure obligation to mask their true objective: either to overburden their adversary or to bury dispositive information in mounds of paperwork.207 Contrary to the goal of fostering efficiencies, the imposition of initial disclosure obligations might add a further layer (and its associated costs and delays) to an already complex discovery process. 208 Critics also argue that initial disclosure obligations do not "fit comfortably" in an adversarial system.209 They assert that there is something anomalous in the notion that a party would simply turn over-without awaiting a specific request-information to an adversary.210 This proves even more troublesome when some of the information which may be subject to initial disclosure obligations may be harmful to the disclosing party's case.211 Providing potentially incriminating information to an adversary challenges the ethical maxim that a lawyer should not advance interests that conflict with a client's.212 Initial disclosure rules thus pit an obligation to comply with the rules of a tribunal against a duty to serve as a client's zealous advocate.213 A further concern is that initial disclosure obligations might override attorney-client or workproduct privileges. 214 Confusion about ethical obligations as well as concerns for the continuing viability of privileges arise in the face of ambiguity as to exactly what and how much information need be disclosed initially. 215 A pervasive concern that runs through the criticisms of initial disclosures is that parties do not know exactly what they "may use" to support their claims or defenses.216 Therefore, they have difficulty determining what or how much information to disclose. 217 Uncertainty as to what information is subject to an initial disclosure obligation is arguably part-and-parcel of a notice pleading system.218 The contention is that pleadings which merely give the opposing party fair notice of the nature of the impending legal claim do not provide sufficient facts to guide the initial disclosure of relevant information.219
B. Specificity in Pleadings: A Foundation for Initial Disclosures
The view that notice pleadings provide insufficient foundation to support significant use of initial disclosures manifested itself in practice.220 Jurisdictions with the strictest fact-based pleading standards also typically have broad initial disclosure requirements. 221 For instance, many civil law countries have fact-based pleading standards and also place emphasis on initial disclosures as principal discovery tools.222 In Germany, for example, complaints must include a statement of the factual basis of a claim.223 Similarly, Spanish courts require litigants to include a description of the factual background underlying a claim at the pleading stage.224 In a related vein (and likely made possible by specific information provided in fact-based pleadings), litigants in German and Spanish courts supplement pleadings with initial disclosure of documents that speak to factual assertions in the pleadings. 225 In contrast, initial disclosures assume a relatively minor role in document discovery in the American judicial system.226 The American system's reduced emphasis on initial disclosure as a principal document discovery vehicle is likely related to its liberal, notice-pleading tradition.227 Until recently, pleading standards in American federal courts were governed by the 1957 case of Conley v. Gibson, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging general failure of a union to adequately protect African-American members from discriminatory discharge was sufficient although it contained "no set of facts."228 Pleadings, according to the Conley Court, were intended only to provide the opposing party with fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and its basis, not its factual specifics.229
When the federal initial disclosure rule was codified in the Rules in 1993 and amended in 2000, Conley and its "no set of facts" pleading standard governed.230 Consequently, critics were concerned that such a 227 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (abrogating Conley); see Final Report, supra note 17, at 5, 7-11 (recommending that fact-based pleading replace notice pleading as a predicate to recommending increased use of initial disclosures as a vehicle for actual and near-total production of discoverable documents); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
228 355 U.S. at 45-48. In Conley, a class of African-American railroad workers brought suit against their employment union. Id. at 42-43. The petitioners alleged that the union did nothing to protect them in face of the demotion or discharge of forty-five AfricanAmerican workers. Id. at 43.
229 Id. at 47. The Conley Court bolstered its decision by pointing to the ensuing discovery period and identifying it as the appropriate time to narrow the disputed issues. Id. at 47-48. The Court's reliance on the discovery process as the time to focus the claim by narrowing the disputed facts and issues reflected a difference in the times. Compare id. (demonstrating comfort in allowing litigants to pass into the discovery phase), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 Ct. , 1950 Ct. (2009 (passing into discovery requires well-pleaded facts lending plausibility to the claim), and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (finding it necessary to avoid the expense of unwarranted discovery). The Conley Court could be so carefree in its decision to push the narrowing of disputed issues off into the discovery phase because, when Conley was decided, discovery was not as costly or time-consuming as it is today. See Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178 (noting that concerns about discovery arose in the 1970s). Therefore, the need to narrow the issues in dispute from the pleading stage in an effort to conserve resources in the subsequent discovery period was less of a concern to the Supreme Court. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 47-48; Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 178. See also the discussion of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) , supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
230 See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45, 47-48 (holding that, unless it appeared beyond doubt that a plaintiff could prove "no set of facts," a complaint should not be dismissed). But see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (noting that the "no set of facts" language of Conley had either not always been interpreted literally or was "questioned, criticized, and explained away").
lax pleading standard would fail to provide parties sufficient information to support an initial disclosure obligation.231 That concern, in turn, led to today's narrow initial disclosure requirement.232
The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, however, fundamentally changed the pleading requirements in American courts.233 In Twombly, the Supreme Court abrogated the "no set of facts" pleading standard of Conley and held that pleadings must set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the plausibility of the conduct alleged.234 The decision centered on a complaint filed by representatives of a class of local telephone and internet service providers alleging defendants' violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.235 In their complaint, the plaintiffs failed to plead to any specific facts, but instead merely mimicked the words of the statute.236 The Supreme Court found this minimal pleading insufficient and held that enough facts must be included in a complaint to state a plausible claim.237 Mere allegations of wrongdoing without any specific evidence would not survive a motion to dismiss.238 The dissent in Twombly held a different view on the ease with which parties should be permitted to cross into discovery. See id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They felt that fear of the burdens of discovery should not justify raising the entry bar. See id. at 583, 593 n.13 ("The potential for 'sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming' discovery is no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater.") (internal citation omitted). The dissent thought discovery could be controlled through case management at the trial level. Id. at 573. Compare id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for demonstrating lack of confidence in trial judge's ability to control discovery), with id. at 560 n.6 (quoting Frank Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 635, 638-39 (1989)) (expressing the view that judicial officers cannot know enough about the case to adequately control discovery).
In sum, there are arguments for and against use of initial disclosures in discovery. The time is ripe for reform of the federal initial disclosure rule to impose a heightened initial disclosure obligation.251 Now is an opportune time for reform because the Supreme Court, in Twombly, raised the pleading requirements in American courts.252 In announcing the plausibility pleading requirement, the Supreme Court's Twombly decision affected more than just the requisite pleading standards in the American civil justice system.253 It challenged the foundation underlying one of the principal arguments against the federal initial disclosure requirement: that notice pleadings provide insufficient foundation to support initial disclosure. 254 The Supreme Court's introduction of a plausible pleading standard in Twombly undercut this argument. 255 Newly required plausible pleadings support increased use of initial disclosures.256 Initially, this is because plausible pleadings are more specific than notice pleadings.257 Indeed, the Twombly Court did not mandate specific but plausible pleadings.258 There is, however, a direct relationship between plausibility and specificity.259 A pleading is only plausible if it includes enough factual information to plausibly suggest wrongful conduct.260 Therefore, the Twombly Court's required inclusion of additional facts necessarily lends specificity, as well as plausibility, to a claim. 261 The argument that specific (i.e. plausible) pleadings support increased use of initial disclosures next rests on a fundamental assumption about the relationship between the specificity of pleadings and usefulness of initial disclosures. 262 The assumption is that initial disclosures are a less effective discovery tool when pleadings are less specific. 263 Conversely, initial disclosures may be more useful when plead-ing standards are more specific.264 More specific pleadings can lead to greater reliance on initial disclosures as document discovery tools because more specific pleadings include more factual detail.265 Thus, parties have a greater opportunity to gain an early understanding of the principal issues in dispute and, accordingly, what they may use to advance their claims or defenses.266 Accordingly, more specific pleadings promote the early exchange of core information as initial disclosures. 267 Evidence of the relationship between specificity in pleading and the usefulness of initial disclosures is apparent in the disparate role of initial disclosures in jurisdictions with different pleading standards. 268 In fact-based pleading jurisdictions, as in many civil law countries, initial disclosures play a greater role in discovery. 269 In the United States, with its notice pleading system characterized until recently by the Supreme Court's decision in Conley, the breadth and potential usefulness of initial disclosures has been minimized since even before their inclusion in the federal discovery rules. 270 Thus, at the extreme ends of the notice to fact-based pleading spectrum, initial disclosures assume little and great usefulness respectively. 271 This practical evidence indicates that there is a correlation between the usefulness of initial disclosures and pleadings of greater specificity.272 Therefore, together with the movement away from pure notice to plausible pleading described in Twombly, so too should the role of initial disclosures in the federal discovery scheme change.273 In conjunction with the imposition of a heightened pleading standard post-Twombly, the federal discovery scheme should place greater emphasis on initial disclosures as a means to achieve cost savings and efficiencies in discovery.274
B. The Middling Path: An Argument for a Federal Initial Disclosure Obligation That Embraces Increased Actual Production but Not the Use of Initial Disclosures as a Principal Document Discovery Tool
The federal initial disclosure rule should be amended to require increased actual production of documents as initial disclosures. 275 Specifically, the rule should mandate actual production as initial disclosures of documents that substantiate plausibly pled facts.276
The plausible pleading standard provides increased opportunity for actual production of discoverable information as initial disclosure because it requires the pleader to narrow and focus the allegations by 273 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559, 562-63; Subrin, supra note 123, at 46 (stating that "more specific pleading is necessary" to guide discovery).
274 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1993) ("[C]ertain basic information [] is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed decision about settlement."); Final Report, supra note 17, at 8.
275 See BLS Pilot Project, supra note 18, at 2. 276 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1993) (expecting more meaningful initial disclosures when the pleadings are more specific and clear); BLS Pilot Project, supra, note 18, at 2. Much in this analysis resembles the requirement to initially disclose information "alleged with particularity," as under the 1993 version of the federal initial disclosure rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note (1993). The principal difference between the initial disclosures mandated under the 1993 rule and those advanced in this Note is that the 1993 rule mandated initial disclosure of information relevant to disputed facts "alleged with particularity in the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (1993) (amended 2000, 2006) . This Note advocates for actual production of discoverable documents that substantiate facts that put a complaint over the plausibility threshold. See supra notes 275-295 and accompanying text; see also Final Report, supra note 17, at 7-8.
Tying initial disclosures to facts that are plausibility pled addresses one of the principal concerns of critics who opposed the particularity standard under the 1993 federal initial disclosure rule. See Subrin, supra note 123, at 39. Critics of the 1993 rule argued that what constituted a fact plead with particularity would be unclear in a notice pleading system; thus, litigants would have no guidance as to what information to disclose initially. See id. Plausibility requirements provide that guidance: any fact that makes a claim more plausible than not should be accompanied by actual production of documents as initial disclosures. But cf. id. Therefore, if the complaint is held to be sufficient then it should necessarily be followed shortly thereafter with actual documents as initial disclosures. But cf. id.
including facts sufficient to lend plausibility to a claim.277 This localization is conducive to the increased use of initial disclosure as a vehicle for actual production of discoverable documents.278 Parties initiating litigation, by virtue of having written a plausible complaint, have necessarily gathered sufficient information at the outset to state a plausible claim.279 Because such information would have informed the drafting of the complaint, it should be readily available to actually produce as initial disclosure.280 In fact, it seems wasteful-as the current Federal Rules permit-for a plaintiff to have conducted the requisite research to state a plausible claim and then merely to turn over a statement describing the category and location of implicated documents to the adversary.281 Doing so adds "a further layer" of undue burden and expense to the discovery process.282 It requires the opposing party to submit a request for the production of documents, which carries with it both time and cost implications.283 Pigeon-holing an adversary into this position should not be permitted; where possible, it is more efficient to circumvent the middle man that is a request for document production.284 This will result in time and cost savings. 285 In turn, plausible complaints allow defendants to focus their defensive efforts, gathering the type and amount of information necessary to refute the more precise allegations.286 Plausible pleadings also lessen the risk to defendants of turning over potentially incriminating information and significantly aiding the adversary.287 If plausible facts are included in the complaint, it is because the plaintiff already has evidence of the specific conduct alleged.288 Therefore, any responsive initial disclosures are unlikely to reveal to a plaintiff much that they did not already know.289 An obligation to disclose incriminating evidence in this context would increase the likelihood of settlement and, thereby, avoid trial. 290 Given that facts lending plausibility to a claim set some reasonable boundaries by more tightly pinpointing the precise wrong alleged,291 parties have more guidance as to what documents to produce as initial disclosures.292 It is further more reasonable to expect that parties could actually produce more information initially given the plausible confines of the allegation.293 Actually disclosing information that specifically substantiates plausibly pled facts is administratively feasible; requiring disclosure of potentially massive amounts of information given the broad and amorphous contours of a notice pleading is not. 294 Thus, the federal initial disclosure rule should follow suit and adopt an actual production requirement as recommended in the Final Report and piloted in the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot. 295 The Federal Rules should not, however, assume the Final Report and Massachusetts Discovery Pilot's approach in conceiving of initial disclosures as a principal document discovery tool.296 Although plausible pleadings provide increased opportunity for actual production of discoverable information as initial disclosures, pleadings may still range in degree of specificity.297 Some may fall toward the more specific end of the spectrum, tightly framing the alleged wrongful act.298 Other pleadings, however, might only barely cross the Twombly Court's plausibility threshold. 299 Thus, even plausible pleadings may not be sufficiently specific to support use of initial disclosure as a principal means of document discovery.300 Litigants may still not have enough by way of guidance to support initial disclosure of requisite documents beyond those implicated specifically in the pleadings.301 They may not yet know all that they may use to support any claims, counter-claims, or defenses.302 It would be unrealistic and unduly burdensome to expect parties to turn over information as initial disclosures beyond that which substantiates facts plausibly alleged. 303 Without sufficient foundation, it would be impracticable to impose a blanket national rule in the image of the Discovery Pilot Project, which imagines near-complete initial disclosure of all discoverable documents with only limited subsequent discovery.304 Because plausibility pleadings do not always provide that requisite foundation, the Massachusetts Discovery Pilot model is likely too ambitious in its entirety to warrant national replication.305
